I try to show that Seneca's Medea provides us with two elements -which, as far as I am aware, have not received proper attention -that complement his approach to the phenomenon of anger, and which can improve our understanding of the Stoic psychology of action defended in De ira. The first element is linked to the question of whether the angry person is responsive to reasons or not; the second one concerns the question of indifference, tolerance and forgiveness, and addresses the issue of Medea's inability to conceive of a more appropriate or desirable reaction to Jason's offense than anger.
Introduction
Among other things, Medea can certainly be seen as the fulfillment of a promise made (and only As a sort of paroxistic complement to the repertoire of monstrous characters that De ira displays in its attempt to "lay out before us all of anger's vices", the main goal of Medea becomes the vivid and tragic incarnation of the theoretical description of anger laid out throughout the first two books of De ira; it becomes, to borrow from Chaumartin, "a didactic account of a thesis" 3 , the main aim of which is to put across certain specific doctrines that a merely theoretical approach cannot accomplish.
Although the pedagogic function of Medea (along with the rest of the exempla qua vites (De ira 3.22.1) that are represented by most of the main characters of Seneca's tragedies) has been heatedly discussed throughout the last six decades, and although a strictly programmatic interpretation of Seneca's tragedies like the one proposed by Berthe Marti long ago 4 is currently out of favor among interpreters, the elements we find in Medea that clearly derive from De ira are too numerous and too central to be ignored. A basic list of those elements could be summed up in the following ideas concerning the nature and features of anger: i) that, unlike other passions, anger expresses itself in a multiplicity of externally perceptible manifestations 5 ; ii) that anger seeks any object to attack when it has become deprived of its original target; iii) that, in a stark contrast to the Stoic sage, the actions and thoughts of a person who is possessed by anger are marked by fluctuations and inconstantia 6 ; iv) that the angry person may even be willing to sacrifice his own life or well-being if that is what it takes for the injustice to be avenged 7 ; v) that the angry person's criterion of what constitutes a fair reparation of the original injustice that triggered his anger tends to be completely irrational and disproportionate 8 ; finally, vi) that the passion of anger, once it has been unleashed, cannot be restrained or brought under control (i.e., that the angry person is not responsive to reasons 9 ), and vii) that it can only be controlled or checked by another sound estimation of it. It must be arraigned before us and condemned; its evils must be searched out and made plain; it must be set side by side with the worst vices, so the sort of thing it is becomes clear" (Tr. Kaster). Cf. 
Revenge and justice
The idea that, once the passion of anger has been unleashed, the angry person is blind to reasons, i.e., that he will not change his mind concerning his perceived necessity for revenge, has been usually considered a central feature of the passion of anger, and the reasons for this can be found scattered throughout 12 As I will point out later, the fact that these descriptions come from the Nurse and the Chorus is of considerable significance. "there is method in this madness" (Berry 2001, 11) 15 . Her actions, even the most heinous of them 16 , are merely the expression of arguments which have as two of its premises the ideas that an injury has been committed, and that it must be avenged. To a certain extent (and leaving aside, for practical reasons, the existential and literary aspects of the play), we might say that what structures the play from the first to the last verse is the dynamic between a question and an exhortation: the question is a moral/legal one (not devoid of a cosmic aspect):
has Jason's initial crime (his disloyalty) been sufficiently punished yet? Is it enough already?
Until the double filicide has been committed, this question is systematically met with a negative answer and an exhortation not to quit, not to feel satisfied, before adequate reparation for the injury has been achieved: after the initial opening lines, where Medea asks the divinities to come in her aid so as to make it possible that Jason's disloyalty does not go unpunished, Medea asks herself (in vv. 19-21) if Jason's death is punishment enough, after which she ends her first monologue with an exhortation to herself to resort to her antiquis vigoris in order to adequately accomplish her vengeance (vv. 40-55 inhuman and whose anger is no longer driven forth by the desire to repair an injustice. Medea does not merely want revenge: she wants her revenge to be proportionate to the injury that has been inflicted on her, and her self-exhortation to not quit before reparation has been accomplished is precisely a desire to correct a balance that has been altered. The whole dynamic of the play is built around the need to calculate with utter precision the punishment 17 "Why hesitate, my soul? Follow your lucky strike. / This is a tiny fraction of your triumph. / You are still in love, mad heart, if this is enough: / to see Jason unmarried. Look for new punishment, / unprecedented, and prepare yourself: / let all morality be gone, and exile shame; / that vengeance is too light which clean hands can perform. / Spur on your anger, rouse your weary self, / from the depths of your heart draw up your former passions / with even greater violence" (Tr. Wilson). 18 The fact that, in contrast to Euripides' version, Seneca decides to place Medea's call for divine help as the opening of the play only serves to stress this structure. This feature of anger, i.e., its blindness to reasons, has been frequently approached through the lens of a sequence of three stages described in De ira:
Et ut scias quemadmodum incipiant adfectus aut crescant aut efferantur, est primus motus non uoluntarius, quasi praeparatio adfectus et quaedam comminatio; alter cum uoluntate non contumaci, tamquam oporteat me uindicari cum laesus sim, aut oporteat hunc poenas dare cum scelus fecerit; tertius motus est iam inpotens, qui non si oportet ulcisci uult sed utique, qui rationem euicit. Primum illum animi ictum effugere ratione non possumus […]. Alter ille motus, qui iudicio nascitur, iudicio tollitur. (De ira 2.4.1) 24
As David Kaufman has stressed, "the only belief correlated with the emotion itself is the conclusion of the beliefs involved in the second movement, stripped of any reference to one's reasons for holding it" (Kaufman 2014, 122) . Although his anger may have arisen from what the agent perceives as an injury that needs to be avenged, once the third stage has been reached, all that remains is the need for revenge, irrespective of what set it in motion 25 .
23 As I insisted in the previous section, this does not mean that Medea's actions are the mechanical outcome of a rigid plan, since neither the exact measure of her revenge nor the means to achieve it are clear to her from the beginning.
24 "To make plain how passions begin or grow or get carried away: there's the initial involuntary movement-a preparation for the passion, as it were, and a kind of threatening signal; there's a second movement accompanied by an expression of will not stubbornly resolved, to the effect that «I should be avenged, since I've been harmed» or «this man should be punished, since he's committed a crime». that is the whole issue: what she sees (and claims) is that she is merely correcting a wrong that has been made, and not only does she not consider her actions as irrational -she considers them to be the incarnation of morality itself. In other words, the desire for revenge that triggers and sustains anger is indeed a blind desire, but (and this is Medea's first contribution to the Stoic account of anger) the angry person cannot confess that to himself: he needs to convince himself that his actions are fully justifiable on account of being the reparation of an injury that has been committed. He needs to make his anger a matter of justice, and he needs to appear (in his own eyes as well as in the eyes of others) as a judge who is merely correcting a balance that has been altered 27 .
This leads us to the second element that I want to stress, i.e., the perceived need for the injustice to be avenged.
Anger, forgiveness and indifference
Throughout the whole of De ira (though more prominently in Book 3), Seneca presents a wide range of arguments against anger: 1) The world is full of vice and vicious 26 Does this mean that we can apply the sequence from De ira 2.4.1 to Medea's actions? To a certain extent: yes. To use Sorabji's terms, we might say that Medea has certainly shifted "from 'revenge is appropriate' to 'I must be revenged'" (Sorabji 2000, 62) , come what may (utique). But the crucial point is that she never realizes that she has done so.
27 That Medea firmly believes that the whole issue has to do with justice and with righting a wrong can be seen most clearly from vv. 531-7, where she claims to be willing to let the gods decide whether it is her who is right (in desiring revenge) or whether it is Jason.
Journal of Ancient Philosophy ISSN 1981-9471 -FFLCH/USP www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.11, n.2. p. 106-119, 2017 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 people; if we were to get angry at every injury, we would constantly live enraged 28 . 2) We all make mistakes and, through them, offend or injure others (and it is not only we who do that, but also the wisest of human beings); if we were to get angry at others for their mistakes, we would be immediately liable to the same reaction on account of our own mistakes 29 . 3) We often commit the same faults that trigger our anger when committed by others 30 . 4) The reports that come to us of an offense or injustice are often (deliberately or non-deliberately)
false; if so, we should be cautious in our reactions 31 . 5) We are imprecise and extremely biased bookkeepers 32 . 6) Contrary to what Aristotelians believe, anger does not work either effectively or efficiently as a stimulus to action, given that, once it has been unleashed, we cannot regain control and will lead us wherever it wants, and not where we had decided 33 . 7) Contrary to what Aristotelians believe, everything we do under the spur of anger can be accomplished (and with better results) with the aid of reason; in no situation, therefore, is anger a necessary evil 34 . 8) Every individual is determined at every moment by the moral and epistemic disposition of his soul, to act as he does; the logical reaction to each and every injury and offense we are faced with is not anger but rather understanding and tolerance 35 .
As is evident, not all of these arguments intend to answer the same questions, and the reasons they provide can be (disproportionately) classified under two main groups: a) anger is not advisable on practical (self-centered) grounds: if we are prone to get angry often, that will have undesirable consequences regarding our personal well-being 36 ; b) anger is an unjust and illegitimate reaction to an injury or offense, and it should be, therefore, avoided. This difference should not be seen as a problem in Seneca's approach; it should rather be seen as an expression of the fact that his is a fundamentally realistic, quasi-pragmatic, approach to the problem of human passions like anger. Whether it be, then, for the sake of justice or for reasons of personal well-being, we should avoid anger altogether, and replace it with a wholly different range of attitudes, attitudes which include, among others and in order of commitment, mere indifference 37 , forgiveness 38 , and repaying an aggression with friendship 39 .
It is precisely this option that Medea fails to perceive 40 , and it is this the second element that I suggested at the beginning that Medea manages to put forward in a way that De ira can't, i.e., the impossibility of letting go of the offense, of letting the injustice go unpunished (by us). 42 "You become angry with this person, then with that one; with your slaves, then with your freedmen; with your parents, then with your children; with acquaintances, then with strangers. There are reasons in abundance on every side, unless your mind has interceded to plead for clemency. Rage will seize you on one person's account on this side, on another's on the other, and your frenzy will continue as new sources of irritation continually arise. Come, unhappy man, will you ever feel love? Oh, how you're wasting good time in a bad business!" (Tr. Kaster) Paulo, v.11, n.2. p. 106-119, 2017 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 a power capable of dragging humanity back to its primitive roots or of annihilating it altogether. Although foreign to rational precepts, Medea's barbarity is as common as human anger or unrestrained emotion-windows owned by each of us that look upon the natural soul (Berry 2001, 17) .
Taken to its utmost extreme, what Medea faces us with is the fact that it is not just our personal ataraxia and euroia that are at risk because of our impossibility to trade ultio for venia; it is, as Creon rightly feared, the possibility of a social organization built on rational principles. The destruction and bloodshed that anger leaves behind in the final scene are not merely symbolical elements: they are meant to be a (fairly realistic, we might add) prediction of the future of any community that condones anger and the obsessive need for reparation as legitimate ways of dealing with any offense 43 .
Whether we take the social/cosmic or the individual approach, what is the upshot of all this? Is Seneca suggesting that we should abandon the perspective of justice altogether? From one perspective, it is true that there are many reasons why a Stoic might not feel too uncomfortable with that conclusion. One of them comes from the fact that we live in the best of all possible worlds and that every event has its place (and function) in a perfect cosmic order 44 . Bearing that in mind, the assumption that our anger is the means through which the order which has been altered by the offense will be restored seems somewhat ludicrous, since it would imply that anger actually represents a cosmic device which is necessary for the cosmic ordered to be maintained. The second reason has to do with the idea that our intervention is not actually necessary for injustices to be punished, given that the actual commitment of the injustice is in itself the worst punishment the offender can receive: Rodrigo Sebastián Braicovich CONICET / Universidad Nacional de Rosario 46 "An objection: «Are you telling me that a good man doesn't become angry if he sees his father being murdered, his mother raped?» No, he will not become angry, but he'll be their champion and defender. Why are you afraid that a proper sense of devotion won't goad him sufficiently, even without anger? Or to follow out your same line of reasoning: «Are you telling me that when he sees his father or son being stabbed, a good man will not weep and faint?» -that is, the things we see happen to women whenever the slight hint of danger strikes them. A good man will follow up his obligations undisturbed and undeterred, and in doing the things worthy of a good man he will do nothing unworthy of a man" (Tr. Kaster). Cf. also De ira 3.12.5-6 and 1.19.7-8: "He will always, whenever he imposes punishment, keep this principle in mind: one penalty is inflicted to correct the wicked, another to destroy them. In either case he will keep his eye on the future, not the past (for as Plato says, a sensible man punishes, not because a wrong has been done, but lest one be done; what's done is beyond recall, what's to come can be prevented). Those whom he wants to make examples of stubborn wickedness he will kill for all to see, not only so that they themselves will die but so that by dying they will deter others. You can see how the person who must weigh and judge all these factors should approach the matter at hand -the power of life and death -with the utmost calm and scrupulousness. A sword is not well entrusted to an angry man".
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